Despite the growing sophistication of antitrust regimes around the world, export cartels benefit from special treatment: they are almost universally tolerated, if not encouraged in the countries of origin. Economists do not offer an unambiguous policy recommendation on how to deal with them due in part to the lack of empirical data. This article discusses arguments for and against export cartels and it identifies the existing gaps in the present regulatory framework. The theoretical part is followed by an analysis of the recent case law: a US cartel challenged with different outcomes in India and South Africa, as well as Chinese export cartels pursued in the US. The Chinese cases are particularly topical as the conduct at stake, apart from being subject to private antitrust actions before US courts, was also challenged within the WTO dispute settlement framework, pointing out to the existing interface between trade and competition. While the recent developments prove that unaddressed issues tend not to vanish, the new South-North dimension has the potential of placing export cartels again on the international agenda. Pragmatic thinking suggests looking for the solution within the WTO framework.
I. Introduction
Antitrust laws 1 remain predominantly national. International trade agreements address public restraints of trade and their relevance in the field of competition seems limited. 2 The international regulatory regime governing competition is a patchwork of rules (different Australia, Korea, Brazil and Mexico. 7 Despite such developments, little has been done to address the issue of export cartels, 8 i.e. cartels affecting only foreign markets.
The contribution of this paper is to identify the existing gaps in the present regulatory framework applicable to export cartels, as well as the challenges posed by their operations in the light of the recent case law. The issue of export cartels is being addressed from the competition law perspective, taking into consideration, where appropriate, an international trade dimension.
This paper first summarizes what we know about export cartels, their functions and significance. It then sets outs the views of different states on export cartels, expressed within the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. This then leads to an analysis of the legal framework applicable to export cartels, with particular regard to extraterritoriality as a unilateral tool available in addressing transnational anticompetitive conduct. The following part looks into recent cases, which point out to various limitations of and challenges faced by the current regulatory regime applicable to export cartels. The conclusions support a call for an international solution to the issue of export cartels in the WTO framework.
II. Lacking Data and Argumentative Battle
Export cartels are peculiar creatures: in most competition law regimes, if put into effect domestically, they would be considered illegal, whereas when implemented externally, in foreign jurisdictions, they are considered legal and tolerated (implicitly, as export cartels are simply not covered by domestic competition laws unless they produce domestic effects), if not encouraged, by the very same country of origin. Some consider their operations as 'the . 8 Harding and Joshua define cartel as 'an organization of independent enterprises from the same or similar area of economic activity, formed for the purpose of promoting economic interests by controlling competition between themselves.' Similarly, the OECD Glossary defines cartel as a formal, mutually beneficial agreement among firms in an oligopolistic industry. It also explicitly acknowledges the existence of public cartels, established by government/s. Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 12; OECD, Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law (1993) , 18-19, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf (visited 7 January 2012). Accordingly, export cartels are cartels which focus only on foreign markets, not affecting directly markets in the jurisdictions where cartel members are located. Furthermore, export cartels can be divided into two groups: national export cartels (membership from the single competition law regime) or international export cartels (membership from different regimes).
most obvious sort of anticompetitive beggar-my-neighbour conduct' 9 or 'little more than an attempt to enhance domestic welfare at the expense of global welfare or the welfare of consumers in the target market in particular.'
10
Although there is a broad consensus against private international hard core cartels, 11 this category, as defined in the OECD Recommendation, does not include any type of export cartels. 12 While, for example, Sweeney distinguishes between international and export cartels, 13 this article takes a different approach and explicitly recognizes that export cartels may be both national or international in membership (for example Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC). 14 In case of the former group it may be argued that they pose little threat: so long as they do not control the world market of a particular good, they should face foreign competition. It may, but does not have to be so, as some national export cartels may have a low world market share, yet a high market share in a particular country or region. 15 In any case this argument does not apply to international export cartels.
Therefore there is no a priori reason why to disregard the issue of export cartels.
Furthermore, export cartels do not have to be purely private agreements and there is, similarly, no reason why public, state-run export cartels should escape the scrutiny.
It is acknowledged in the literature that empirical data on export cartels is lacking.
16
This state of affairs seriously handicaps attempts to analyze this issue. It may well be that the greatest significance of export cartels, as seen through the lens of free trade, is symbolic. principles underlying trade liberalization have been the antithesis of mercantilism, which is characterized by beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The fact of tolerance or even encouragement of export cartels may be seen, as Sweeney puts it, as a form of neo-mercantilism 17 and thus contrary to the efforts of trade liberalisation. As the same time, Sokol rightly cautions that due to the lack of empirical data solutions to the issue of export cartels may be too reliant on theory with all the risks connected with the acceptance of various assumptions, which may be misguided.
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Arguments in favour of export cartels are various, but not many. The first argument underlines the 'enabling role' of export cartels. It is argued that companies may create export cartels to jointly market products, enter new markets, or achieve sufficient scale to actively participate in world commerce. 19 It is usually claimed in the context of small and medium size undertakings which, arguably, but for the export cartels would be unable to expand and successfully compete internationally. At the same time it is not clear if such firms actually organize export cartels. 20 This argument is coupled with an efficiency claim. It is argued that export cartels may lead to efficiency gains, for example by conducting common sales activities, market research, negotiation of shipping rates etc. Those gains, in competitive markets, would lead to more competition in downstream market, which in turn would lead to lower prices. 21 Therefore such agreements, although lessening competition among their participants, would not act to the detriment of consumers thanks to the efficiency gains. 17 Sweeney, above n 13, at 96. 18 Sokol, above n 16, at 971. 19 Evenett, et al., above n 7, at 1233 . 20 Becker, above n 10, at 116. For example Larson in his study of US Webb-Pomerene export cartels showed that in 1962 (granted a long time ago) 70 per cent of registered export cartels had no members who were small companies (i.e. firms holding assets worth $1 million or less Apart from the anti-cartel arguments valid for all types of cartels and concerning their ability to fix prices at supra-competitive levels or divide markets, 27 there are some economic arguments that respond directly to the rationale offered in favour of export cartels. They particularly reflect upon the arguably benign effects of export cartels on domestic markets, i.e. domestic markets are not immune from the effect of export cartels. First of all, export cartels whose members have an important part of the domestic market can influence domestic supplies and prices by their export decisions. 28 In other words, if a significant part of capacity until then engaged in supply of the domestic market is devoted to supply the export markets, the domestic output and prices will be affected. But it seems that the most important argument against the tolerance of export cartels, from the perspective of their home state, is 22 Becker, above n 10, at 116. Bhattacharjea notes that when assessing the impact of an export cartel at the end of the day 'it all depends', and that a number of issues needs to be considered in each particular case, among them: 32 (1) is the cartel a new entrant, (2) the nature of efficiencies claimed, (3) the market structure, (4) the degree of import penetration. Dick, 33 while analysing the operations of US registered export cartels provides a useful general framework, distinguishing monopoly-promoting and efficiency-enhancing export cartels. He notes that the monopoly hypothesis (export cartels exercise market power, raise prices and lead to reduced exports, as firms export less in a cartel than when acting competitively 34 ) is more plausible when cartels have a large share of the world market and face relatively disorganized buyers. At the same time, some export cartels while internationally not influential may have a significant share of particular markets. This can be an issue in case of former colonies, due to survival of trade patterns shaped in the past. 35 The less competition a cartel faces in the targeted country, the greater its opportunity to exercise market power. In effect, the countries with less developed industries are more likely to suffer harm, than developed economies with 29 Becker, above n 10, at 119. The foregoing arguments for and against export cartels show that an unambiguous policy recommendation on how to handle them and a consensus among experts are lacking.
Export cartels may or may not cause severe harm however the empirical data in that regard is missing and there is no reason to believe it may be collected, taking into consideration their predominantly secret character. 38 At the same time there are valid arguments showing that in certain circumstances export cartels may be beneficial to consumers. As well as analysing export cartels from a law and economic perspective, regard also has to be had to institutional assessment in relation to national competition authorities' capacity (legal instruments, expertise, budgets). While a case-by-case analysis of export cartels may be a favourable approach due to the unsettled economic stance, any proposed solution should take into account the actual capacity constraints of competition authorities in many developing and least-developed countries, which may not be able to evaluate individual cases or monitor the domestic effects of home-based export cartels.
III. Discussion in the WTO Framework 39
In 1996 a WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy has been set up to consider issues on the interface of trade and competition as part of 36 Immenga, above n 28, at 126. 37 Dick, above n 21, 11. 38 The word 'secret' reflects the fact that even when domestically legal, export cartels have no incentive to mark their presence, as they could be subject to legal action in targeted jurisdictions. They are 'predominantly' secret, because some regimes grant their export cartels exemptions from the scope of national competition laws only after their notification/registration and require reporting. 58 At the 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore the WTO members decided to set up three working groups on trade and competition, trade and investment, and on transparency in government procurement. They also instructed the WTO General Council, the highest decision making body of the WTO, to look into the possible of the Ministerial Declaration. They raised key questions, among them: whether the definition of hardcore cartels will include export cartels, what would be the scope of exemptions from the general prohibition of the former, and whether intergovernmental arrangements are to fall under the definition of hardcore cartels. 59 The deadlock of negotiations during the Cancun Ministerial Conference led to the negotiation of the so-called 'July 2004 package'. In this framework the WTO General Council decided that the issue of competition policy 'will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round', 60 and the Working Group became inactive.
IV. Present Legal Framework
Virtually all jurisdictions permit export cartels, 61 either explicitly, requiring prior notification and/ or registration, or implicitly, by limiting cartels prohibition to those affecting domestic markets only. If the care for national welfare is the objective of national competition laws, then, at least in the short turn, 62 export cartels positively contribute to the national economy, as they extract surplus from foreign consumers and transfer it into the profits of home based companies. 63 Some of the explicit exemptions are motivated by mercantilism, a willingness to
give national companies an extra competitive advantage. 64 Hoekman and Saggi claim that it is the 'sole purpose' of the still legal status of export cartels. 65 The means by which export cartels remain legal in the state of origin matter. The more common implicit exemption deprives the home state of the possibility to monitor possible efficiency gains, and makes it difficult to scrutinize any spillover effects on the domestic market. 66 At the same time, the lack of any registration requirement in the state of origin makes it more difficult for export cartels' competitors or even competition authorities in targeted states to discover cartel operations. In this sense, explicit exemptions and registration requirements provide some transparency. They allow competitors or targeted states to react if needed. Also national competition authorities benefit from the possibility of oversight to make sure that the companies engaged in an export cartel do not try to act in an anticompetitive way domestically, or that their activities do not have spillover effects on domestic markets.
67
Until now the international community has not developed international rules or mechanisms addressing cartels, including export cartels. 68 There is no international forum authorized to work towards a legally binding compromise or common rules in this regard.
The WTO is without a mandate to deal with such issues, although in cases of state-related export cartels there is a possibility of triggering the WTO dispute settlement framework in at least three circumstances. 71 The case concerned an agreement between the US and Japan, in which Japan, in order to avoid antidumping investigation, agreed inter alia, to monitor export prices of semiconductors to the US, so as to restrict the exports below certain price. The panel found that although the monitoring procedure was only a non-binding administrative guidance, it discouraged exporters to sell at lower prices, and could be considered a 'governmental measure' within the meaning of Article XI:1, if (1) 'reasonable grounds exist to believe that the sufficient incentives or disincentive existed for non-mandatory measures to take effect', and (2) 'the operation of the measures to restrict export of semi-conductors at prices below company-specific costs was essentially dependent on Government action or intervention'. Ibid, at para. with the Chinese government actively supporting or forcing cartel creation and its operations.
Although none of these cases has been settled yet, they raise a number of issues in the context of challenging transnational anticompetitive conduct with a foreign state involvement.
Moreover, they point out to the interrelated trade dimension, as the conduct at stake was also challenged within the WTO framework, providing new dynamics into the issue of export cartels.
A. American soda ash export cartel cases
The Africa. 102 This section analyzes these two cases.
The Indian case: A tale with a dramatic punchline
In 1996 the Alkali Manufacturers Association of India (AMAI), which represents major producers of soda ash in India filed a complaint and applied for a temporary injunction (to stop imports) with the Indian antitrust authority, the MRTP Commission, against ANSAC for various infringements of the competition law. 105 Section 12A(1) allowed for temporary injunction 'where during an inquiry before the Commission, it is proved (…) that any undertaking or any person is carrying on, or is about to carry on (…) unfair, trade practice and such (…) practice is likely to affect prejudicially the public interest or the interest of any trader (…) or of any consumer or consumers generally (…).' Section 37 of the MRTP Act allowed the Commission to investigate and prohibit any restrictive trade practice (RTP) after funding it 'prejudicial to the public interest'. Section 38, on the other hand, provided a presumption, considering RTPs prejudicial to the public interest if not justified under so-called 'gateways', a list of defenses under section 38, which were not investigated in this case. 106 In the injunction the Commission referred to section 33, which defined 'Registrable agreements relating to restrictive trade practice', classifying the conduct as falling under section 33(1)(j): 'any agreement to sell goods at such prices as would have the effect of eliminating competition or a competitor'. Later it seems to have reclassified the conduct into falling under section 33(1)(d) 'any agreement to purchase or sell goods or to tender for the sale or purchase of goods only at prices or on terms or conditions agreed upon between the sellers or purchasers'. 107 Section 14 'Orders where party concerned does not carry on business in India: Where any practice substantially falls within [monopolistic, restrictive, or unfair, trade practice, relating to the production, storage, supply] distribution or control of goods of any description or the provision of any services and any party to such practice does not carry on business in India, an order may be made under this Act with respect to that part of the practices which is carried on in India.' 108 The Commission analyzed the intricacies of the planned transaction and found the there was a sufficient nexus between the Indian consumers and ANSAC. There was business correspondence between some of the Indian consumers and ANSAC quoting a specific price of soda ash, which was reflected in letters of credit opened by Indians producers in favour of the Singaporean entity (which ANSAC used arguable in circumvention of Indian law) in an Indian bank. Moreover, there was a bill of lading indicating a port in the US as a port of loading and an Indian port as a port of discharge. ?id=f0148a8a-1c78-4e76-9776-485ffbf2ec7a (visited 7 January 2012) . At the same time it should be clarified that the US government does not intervene each time when a US export cartel is challenged abroad. The relevant provisions providing for export cartels in the US make it crystal clear that they afford, under certain circumstances, immunity only from the US antitrust law. The prime example of a US export cartel challenged abroad without the US administration getting involved is Wood Pulp. See Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v the political arena as a trade matter, outside the scope of competition law, or any of the existing multilateral regimes.
The South African case: enforcement success story
The case concerned ANSAC imports to South Africa. It was brought in 1999 by Botash, a Botswanian producer of soda ash, with its Southern African distributor, 125 (1) Despite the assurances of the President of ANSAC in his testimony in this case that it would not happen, 139 some of ANSAC members after its withdrawal kept supplying market on their own. 140 Looking at the levels of soda ash export from the US to the South Africa (see the chart below), it may be argued that the litigation had a negative impact in the short-term.
A significant drop in US exports took place in 2002, the Competition Tribunal having issued orders against ANSAC in 2001. Still, the levels of exports increased steadily in the following years, reaching very high levels. In fact 2010 seems to be the best year in fifteen years from the perspective of exported quantities. At the same time these raw numbers need to be read with caution as they reflect the whole business environment as such, and not only the impact of the litigation. In any case it seems that from the supply side, the withdrawal of ANSAC not only did not affect market negatively in the medium-term, but actually improved the supply.
Source: US Department of the Interior and US Geological Survey, available at http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/soda_ash/ (visited 7 January 2012).
It is also worth noting that the when ANSAC was found in breach of EU competition 
US Exports of Soda Ash to the South Africa
(in thousand metric tons) EU competition law. 142 It is possible that the relative lack of importance of the SA market to ANSAC meant its members were not interested in a similar solution in this case. One should note that while the case was ongoing, for nine years, as there was no injunction in force ANSAC kept exporting to the SA and its members were bound by the agreement not to sell individually.
For a thorough assessment of the effect of the cartel on prices a comprehensive analysis of price levels of soda ash would be necessary. Such exercise lies beyond the scope of this paper, yet a general perspective may be offered. Was soda ash any less or more . 143 See above text accompanying note 141. 144 Belgium and Argentina are used in this comparison for illustrative purposes. There are considerable, regular exports of US soda ash to these two countries: bigger than in case of SA, yet neither of these countries is a main US soda ash export market.
One can also look at the difference between the US export price to the SA (which includes the transportation and insurance costs) and the average annual value of the soda ash in the US. The latter is not a price 'but rather the value of the combined revenue of California (free on board). This trend was similar in case of US export prices to Belgium, while the difference between the US export price to Argentina and the average value in the US remained considerable. This broad comparison allows us to infer that the (extraterritorial) application of the SA competition law led to both better supply and most likely lower prices. The years to come will allow for better assessment in terms of the effect on prices, but the extraterritorial reach of the SA competition law was itself confirmed in practice. The competition authority proved it has the necessary capacity to actively enforce competition law. These are the marks of a success in the area of antitrust law enforcement. This case shows that competition regimes, in principle, when equipped with statutory provisions allowing for extraterritoriality, and when not hindered by internal or external political pressure, are able to unilaterally successfully challenge foreign export cartels.
B. Chinese export cartels
In the last few years on a number of occasions antitrust actions were brought against Chinese export cartels affecting US markets. In all these cases Chinese authorities are directly involved or at least implicated, and the defendants are in most cases state-owned enterprises. confidential.' There was also a system of sanctions in place, including revocation of the membership or even an indirect threat of a cancellation of the export license. Against this backdrop, the defendants, supported by the Chinese authorities, argued that they were compelled under Chinese law, and although the ministry itself did not set prices, they were unable to export at a non-conforming price. 158 The court concluded that although such a brief was entitled to 'substantial deference', it was not to be regarded as conclusive. This was particularly so in the instant case, where the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiffs directly contradicted the brief's position.
159
The plaintiffs claimed there was no single law or regulation forcing a particular price or price agreement at issue. Furthermore, there was evidence showing that the defendants were setting prices themselves by hand voting. In addition, it was argued that defendants set the minimum price, but at the same time undercut each other. 160 This evidence pointed out to a complex relationship between the Chinese companies and the Chamber, making it difficult to determine the degree of their independence with regard to prices.
161
Due to the non-transparent Chinese legal system, frequently relying on administrative instructions, it was unclear 'whether defendants were performing a government function, whether they were acting as private citizens pursuant to governmental directives or whether they were acting as unrestrained private citizens'. 162 In addition, the court noted that a scenario where the defendants formed the cartel and only then asked for the state recognition was also conceivable. Finally the court considered the records too ambiguous 'to foreclose further inquiry into the voluntariness of defendants' actions' at that stage and the motion to dismiss on the basis of the state-related avoidance techniques was dismissed.
163
In the most recent decision in this case, of September 2011, the district court denied the defendants a motion for summary judgment based on the foreign compulsion defence.
164
Although it found the doctrine generally applicable when a party finds itself 'between the rock of its own local law and the hard place of U.S. law', but it found 'no rock and no hard place', in the case at stake. . 168 At the next such attempt, the earlier deflecting member participated, but prospects thereof were described as 'not great'. 169 While the defendants argued that the 161 Ibid, at 556. 162 Ibid, at 559. 163 Ibid. As the plaintiffs field a second amended complaint, adding two more defendants to the case-American corporation, directly purchasing vitamin C from Chinese manufacturer, the court dismissed the complaint with a leave to replead, making allegations against the new defendants. 164 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, No. 06-MD-1738 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2011 . 165 Ibid, at 2. 166 Ibid, at 11-12. 167 Ibid, at 53-55. 168 Ibid, at 12. 169 Ibid, [22] [23] company was penalized for its behavior and required to participate in the second shutdown, the documentary evidence did not support these claims. In Animal Science the court faced a very similar issue to the one in Vitamin C case.
The Chamber of Commerce, a 'governmental appendage' 183 empowered to administer the export licenses, was involved in setting the minimum prices for the exported products. There was also a threat of severe punishment in place in case of non-compliance. 184 In this case the court found that government compulsion lasted for a long time and was achieved not by a particular act, but was rather created by a legal regime, employing 'various regulatory mechanisms producing a composite effect of a never-ceasing correlation between the minimum price requirement and punitive measures for non-compliance with it'. 185 It was established that the Chinese government compelled the defendants, and forced upon them 'a' minimum price. 186 Yet the court noted that if the actual price figures were never set, or set but left unknown to the defendants and to the authorities enforcing the minimum price requirement, 187 then any price-fixing agreement is to be treated as a private one, outside the realm of sovereign defences. Similarly, if the prices were known to the defendants, it is still possible that they have entered into supra-minimum price agreements. In such a case, these agreements could be illegal under US antitrust, irrespective of whether the Chinese authorities had the right to enforce them. 188 The district court dismissed the complaint after finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish court subject-matter jurisdiction. Leave to amend the complaint was granted, 189 but the plaintiffs declined this and appealed. The Third Circuit vacated the district court decision on jurisdictional issues and the case was remanded for further proceedings on merits.
190
The district court in Animal Science, compared to Vitamin C, was much more thoughtful about the nature of the Chinese regulatory regime. This is a welcome development. It remains to be seen how the court addresses the issue of foreign sovereign compulsion defence, especially in light of the intervening opinion in Vitamin C.
Similarly to The Panel report in this case was circulated to WTO members in July 2011. 193 The
Panel found only six measures related to minimum export price requirement within its frame of reference. These were the measures, such as charters or regulations of chambers of commerce which, as it was pointed out, were related to in the domestic antitrust proceedings in Vitamin C. 194 The complainants alleged that China enforces minimum export prices exporters as well as penalties imposed on authorities granting licenses to non-comforting exporters. 195 In this regard references were made to all the above mentioned pending domestic antitrust proceedings (Vitamin C, Animal Science, Resco 
Mind the US-Japanese Friction
The Chinese cases raise somehow similar challenges to those posed by Japanese export cartels in 1970s. At that time Japanese exports were heavily cartelized: in 1977 there were eighty-six officially registered export cartels, accounting for 20-30 per cent of all exports. 212 Japanese legislation not only exempted them from the scope of national competition laws, but the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry could have either suggested creation of a cartel through non-binding administrative guidance, and when this proved insufficient, it had the capacity and intended to order creation of a cartel. 213 In light of the Japanese domestic cases from that period, Matsushita concludes that the administrative guidance might have been regarded as an official act of the Japanese government. 214 The economists had divergent options as to the competitive impact of the Japanese export cartels. 215 The growing concern among the US businesses with the Japanese unfair business practices in general led to intergovernmental negotiations between the US and Japan, 216 various antidumping cases and trade disputes, 217 and effectively to a review of Japanese competition law, with Japan committing itself not to use cartels as tools of the industrial policy. 218 In the landmark antitrust case from this period Matsushita, 219 which made its way to the Supreme Court, US TV manufactures alleged that the Japanese TV manufactures created a cartel, applying predatory pricing on the US market, so as to drive US competitors out of the market. It was a duly registered export cartel under Japanese law. To afford the predation, it cartelized the domestic market where it charged supra-competitive prices. This case raised the issue of the foreign sovereign compulsion defence, although the Supreme Court itself did not address it, after finding that the alleged conduct did not injure the plaintiffs. 220 The Court of Appeals found the compulsion defence inapplicable, noting inter alia that defendants departed from the minimum price set by the Japanese authorities and that the domestic part of the cartel violated Japanese laws. The court also concluded that the Japanese regulatory scheme 'merely provided an umbrella' allowing for the domestic antitrust exemption. 221 The
Japanese government in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court supported Japanese companies informing that it has directed them to organize the cartel and that it put in place the regulatory regime concerning prices. 222 This position was supported by the US government. 223 As
Ganjaei points out, 224 the stance of the US government reflected the changes in its foreign policy and the agreements between the US and Japan according to which Japan adopted voluntary controls of car exports to the US, 225 a measure which later was itself prohibited in the outcome of the Uruguay Round. 226 The US-Japanese friction shows how the US was able, through its foreign and trade policies, to bilaterally address and influence foreign competition regime.
VI. Conclusion
The creativity of the corporate world seems unlimited. There is no reason to believe that businesses around the world would refrain from taking advantage of the present regulatory system allowing for export cartels. The absence of empirical data should not lead to the conclusion that the issue is nonexistent. The unique treatment accorded to export cartels at the moment, as compared to other types of cartels, by their tolerance or encouragement, and the immunity from domestic antitrust laws, is not a beneficial policy in the long-run.
The recent case law illustrates the deficiencies of the present regulatory framework.
The lack of an international mechanism addressing export cartels forces targeted states to rely on extraterritorial application of national competition laws. In general this unilateral route, from a practical perspective, requires expertise and resources, which are scarce in many jurisdictions.
As the Indian ANSAC case shows, the lack of an explicit legal basis in national legislation providing for extraterritoriality may hinder such actions. It also underlines that when binding international mechanisms in competition law are lacking, the matter will be addressed through trade policy when important economic interests are at stake. It suggests that it is in the best interest of the less powerful states who are interested in legal resolution of controversies arising from transnational anticompetitive conduct and who lack trade muscle, to work towards international consensus in this area. At the same time, the South African case shows that when competition law is free to take its course unobstructed, extraterritoriality may lead to positive outcomes and may be a useful tool in the fight with export cartels. It is noteworthy that both cases concerned the same officially registered and publicly known export cartel, which was earlier challenged in a developed competition law regime. This seems to be the only case of this nature.
The Chinese/US cases, in general, point out that export cartels may come also from the global South. If this development becomes a larger phenomenon, it could, in principle, reframe the discussion on export cartels in terms of possible tradeoffs. Some economists suggested tying a general prohibition of export cartels in developed countries 227 with market access concessions on behalf of and transfers from developing world as a form of reciprocation. 228 Were export cartels to become more widespread in the global South, any such 'package deal' would require reconsideration. Moreover, the Chinese export cartel cases 227 Compare the discussion in the framework of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction of Trade and Competition Policy, see above text accompanying notes 39-60. 228 In this vein Hoekman and Mavroidis, above n 76, at 19, [21] [22] Hoekman and Saggi, above n 65. show that government's involvement in transnational anticompetitive conduct, like export cartels, poses a challenge to antitrust regimes. If the bulwark of sovereignty proves to provide a shelter in such scenarios, then there is a risk that state-protected export cartels become more prevalent, undermining not only the competition laws, but also the rules of international trade, by according entities engaged in such anticompetitive conduct a comparative advantage. This perspective may in fact incentivize international community to look for a solution to the issue of both private and public, state(s)-driven, export cartels. While it is unlikely to reach a compromise prohibiting public export cartels dealing with natural resources, 229 this as such should not restrain us from placing them on the international agenda as well, looking for a mutually beneficial solution with an intention to tighten up the gaps in the current regulatory framework.
The limits of unilateralism when dealing with export cartels lead to a conclusion that an international solution is needed. Soft forms of cooperation 230 until now did not provide an
In recent years competition laws were introduced in many jurisdictions and considerable effort was invested by the international community in competition advocacy and voluntary cooperation between competition authorities (best exemplified by the creation of the International Competition Network which now has more than 100 members), leading to more dialogue and understanding in this area of law. This led, for example, to international consensus on international private hard core cartels (but not export cartels) as harmful and actual cooperation in their pursuit across jurisdictions. Taking this into consideration, the time is perhaps ripe to come back to the discussion on export cartels and to revisit narrowfocused proposals in this regard which could be introduced within the WTO framework. The one suggested by Sweeney seems particularly appealing: an agreement taking into account in antitrust investigations not only domestic, but also foreign harm caused by such cartels;
reinforced by a positive comity (a commitment to investigate a particular case at the request of a foreign jurisdiction). 233 Such a regime could be adopted as a plurilateral agreement, preferably on the side and not within a major negotiation round, open to all interested jurisdictions and subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Taking into consideration that China, as the discussed cases present, is caught between a rock of antidumping and a hard place of antitrust actions, it may be interested in such a solution. The US, on the other hand, facing now Chinese export cartels with considerable state involvement may find it worthwhile to sit down and negotiate as well so as to avoid similar but greater problems in the future. The European Union, which already within the framework of the WTO Woking Group took the view that the issue of export cartels should be addressed, would surely join the talks. While developing countries were quite sceptical about competition issues on the trade agenda, the Indian experience with the US soda ash export cartel, discussed above, shows that they may now find it in their best interests to work towards an international solution to export cartels, especially if approached outside the major round of trade negotiations. 234 In fact if the tipping point has not been reached yet, the recent developments allow hoping that it is not too far away and more thought should be now
